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This paper exploits the exogenous variation of the U.S. state enterprise zone policies to estimate 
the impact of geographically-targeted tax incentives on a number of dimensions of local 
economic growth.  The econometric analysis uses plant-level data from 11 state programs to sort 
out growth outcomes into gross flows separately accounted for by new, existing, and vanishing 
establishments in the target areas.  The paper extends the literature by moving beyond a 
dichotomous treatment indicator to incorporate the contribution of a number common zone 
policy features.  Although the findings of no net mean impacts of the zone programs on various 
measure of growth is consistent with previous research, the disaggregation into various gross 
flows and examination of the heterogeneity of policy implementation shows that the impacts of 
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1. Introduction 
During the past quarter century, geographically targeted tax incentive programs have become an 
increasingly popular method to administer economic development initiatives by focusing on attracting 
and retaining firms in specific economically blighted areas.  Following the UK experience from the 
early 1980s (McDonald, 1995), a substantial majority of US states have implemented economic 
revitalization programs, mainly referred to as enterprise zone (EZ) programs.  Twenty-five years later, 
states are now re-visiting their programs, trying to determine whether and how to proceed with these 
incentives.  Partially because the federal government did not implement a national program until 1994 
(HUD, 1999), comprised initially of “Empowerment Zones” and “Enterprise Communities,” the states 
implemented programs that varied considerably in terms of designation criteria, geographic size of the 
program, and incentives offered (HUD 1997).  Such variety is a precious resource, as it stems from 
political decisions that are likely uncorrelated to future economic trends in the target areas.  These 
natural experiment conditions favor comparative analysis to test the effectiveness of different 
implementation features as best practices for future interventions.  EZ areas are also small enough that 
appropriate comparison areas can be found within the same regional economies.  Thus, program 
impacts can be estimated from empirical models that control for factors contributing to the observed 
outcomes that are independent from the program intervention.  State EZ programs therefore have the 
potential to offer valuable empirical evidence on the effectiveness of geographically targeted tax 
incentives and to contribute evidence regarding the longstanding debate on the effect of tax 
differentials on firm location decisions. 
Unfortunately, findings from the existing enterprise zone literature are difficult to translate into 
useful policy recommendations.  One problem is the inconsistency of previous results.  Studies have 
used various methodologies, including descriptive case studies and careful econometric evaluations.  
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Many of the evaluations have examined only one state’s programs, and a few have evaluated a single 
zone.  Conflicting results underscore the inability to generalize the empirical evidence of EZ studies.  
Findings are particularly hard to generalize because of the variety of EZ approaches and local 
economic conditions, but many impact evaluations only consider the presence or absence of the 
program in a particular time and place rather than taking into account the policy features of the zone or 
the generosity of tax incentives (Peters and Fisher, 2002).  While findings from such studies are useful 
for helping evaluate whether to continue or terminate a particular program, they offer few actionable 
recommendations for improving the programs and they offer few hints as to whether the programs may 
be effective in other locations.  
This paper contends that an effective way to evaluate state EZ programs is to use establishment-
specific panel data across multiple states to comparatively estimate the impact of state-specific policy 
implementation features on gross flow measures of economic growth.  That is, in addition to examining 
net changes in the economic outcomes of employment, capital expenditures, sales, and payroll per 
employee in the manufacturing sector, those outcomes are also separately accounted for by new 
establishments, previously existing establishments, and vanishing establishments, business 
establishments that have either closed or moved.  Net changes can mask the churning of business 
establishment births and deaths that are common in both growing and shrinking economies (Davis, et 
al., 1996; Dunne, et al., 1989).  In addition, sorting growth outcomes into the gross flows is important 
to properly account for the impacts of different policy features.  For example, incentives in target areas 
such as newly equipped industrial parks may be focused on attracting new establishments to areas close 
to pockets of severe economic and social distress.  Central city industrial or business district incentives 
may instead be more focused on helping existing businesses to survive or grow.  Thus, empirically 
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testing whether certain policy features best favor the attraction of new businesses rather than the 
retention of existing production activities helps inform the design of future interventions. 
This paper, unlike much of the existing EZ literature, allows such testing to be performed by 
using plant level manufacturing data from U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database 
(LRD) to estimate the marginal impact of specific EZ policy features on the baseline growth rates of 
the four different economic outcomes separately sorted into outcomes accounted for by new, existing 
and vanishing establishments.  The analysis is performed using data from 11 states with a two-step 
econometric model that yields impact estimates reasonably free of selection and omitted variable biases 
under plausible assumptions on the selection into treatment process.  As noted by Peters and Fisher 
(2002), to comparatively analyze the impact of geographically targeted tax incentives, it is important to 
properly measure and control for the value to businesses of the incentive packages offered in the target 
areas.  A measure of the monetary value of the EZ tax incentive packages is included in the 
econometric model based on figures provided by the “hypothetical firm” method embedded in Fisher 
and Peters’ (1998) Tax and Incentive Model (TAIM) algorithm. 
Results of the analysis show that state EZ programs do not have a positive mean impact on the 
net growth rates of employment, capital expenditures, sales or payroll per employee.  However, the 
impact of the EZ programs reveal more complex dynamics when growth outcomes are separately 
sorted into the gross flows.  Some of the state-specific policy features are associated with positive 
outcomes in new and existing establishments, findings that lead to well-defined policy 
recommendations to refine future geographically targeted business incentive programs. The null impact 
of the EZ programs on the net growth rates is accounted for by an EZ-induced increase in the rate of 
business failures in the target areas, offsetting the treatment-induced positive impact on the attraction of 
new businesses and on the growth of existing EZ businesses.   
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The reminder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 further discusses the enterprise 
zone concept and briefly surveys some recent literature.  Section 3 describes the ZIP code level 
programmatic and outcome data.  Sections 4 and 5 describe the econometric methods and the 
sensitivity analysis.  Section 6 illustrates the results, and section 7 discusses the major findings of the 
paper in the context of how they can be used to inform future geographically targeted economic 
development initiatives. 
 
2. State Enterprise Zones  
In the United States, the term “enterprise zones” commonly applies to programs that target tax breaks 
and economic development incentives to a subset of economically distressed areas.  There is debate as 
to whether incentives should indeed be targeted in such a way at places rather than at people (Gyorko, 
1998; Ladd, 1994).  Typical economic justifications for place-based interventions focus on various 
market failures that challenge the sustainability of particular locations.  For example, inefficient labor 
markets may not adjust promptly to changes in economic opportunities.  In urban areas, there may also 
be a “spatial mismatch” between the central city residence of underemployed minorities and 
inaccessible suburban job opportunities (e.g., Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998; Kain, 1994).  Broader 
externality arguments are also invoked to justify geographic targeting  (Bartik, 2000; Gyourko, 1998; 
Sridhar, 2001).  Firms’ location decisions based solely on perceived private costs and revenues often do 
not account for all of the associated collective costs.  These costs may include urban sprawl and traffic 
congestion as well as environmental degradation and public health and safety costs associated with 
uneven development. 
 In practice, the programs implemented by the states as “enterprise zones” vary considerably in 
terms of incentives offered, eligibility criteria and zone size and number (Erickson and Friedman, 
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1991), and there is little consensus regarding use of the term (Brintnall and Green, 1988).  We study a 
sub-set of 11 state enterprise programs that maintain focused geographic targeting in order to evaluate 
whether such targeting can be effective.  In addition, there is growing evidence that targeting works 
best when the number of areas targeted remains limited (Anderson and Wassmer, 2000; Wilder and 
Rubin, 1996), so we exclude from our analysis state EZ programs that have “targeted” a large fraction 
of the state. 
Despite the wide popularity of EZ programs, the available empirical evidence on their 
effectiveness at creating local economic growth is still contradictory (e.g., Boarnet, 2001; Boarnet and 
Bogart, 1996; Buss 2001; Greenbaum and Engberg, 2000; Papke, 1994, 1993; Wilder and Rubin, 
1996).  Certainly, some of the variability in outcomes is due to the wide differences in zone policy, 
especially since many of the studies only focus on single zones or states.  As exhaustively reviewed by 
Wilder and Rubin (1996), early evaluation studies from the mid 1980s were mostly descriptive case 
studies (e.g., Jones 1985, 1987) that focused on measuring economic activity in single zone areas at 
pre- post-designation periods, with no attempt to empirically separate effects of zone designation from 
those from other exogenous economic trends.  Subsequent EZ evaluation efforts have used outcome 
data retrieved from interviews with zone program and business officials (e.g., Erickson and Friedman, 
1990a, 1990b; GAO, 1988; HUD, 1986).  These studies produced differing results on program 
effectiveness and were criticized for biases due to the tendency of survey respondents to overestimate 
the outcomes attributable to EZ incentives (e.g., Bartik and Bingham, 1995; Boarnet, 2001; Wilder and 
Rubin, 1996).  A number of more recent studies have used econometric models drawing upon empirical 
evidence from single states’ programs (Boarnet and Bogart, 1996; Dowall, 1996; Lambert and Coomes, 
2001; O’Keefe 2004; Papke, 1993, 1994).  These studies have the advantage that they are reasonably 
free from biases due to different initial conditions between the target areas and the rest of the national 
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and regional economy.  Such evidence from a single state, however, does not allow for the 
generalization of findings to other places or times due the extensive heterogeneity of the state EZ 
programs. 
To provide results with larger external validity, Bondonio (2002), Bondonio and Engberg 
(2000), Greenbaum and Engberg (2004), and Peters and Fisher (2002) have utilized longitudinal 
business data from the US Census Bureau to perform comparative econometric evaluation studies 
across states.  Such studies point toward a negligible net impact of zone designation.  Greenbaum and 
Engberg (2004) and Bondonio (2002), however, suggest that the zero net impact results may indeed 
derive from a positive treatment effect on attracting new firms in the target areas and a 
counterbalancing loss of business activity due to the treatment-induced acceleration of downsizing and 
closure of existing firms.  This consistent with earlier findings that any positive impact from zones is 
mainly attributable to new firms and expansions (Erickson, 1992).  Peters and Fisher (2002) also 
analyze the composition of economic growth and decline in EZ areas with a descriptive analysis of the 
flows of establishment births, deaths and relocations into and out of zones.  
This paper builds on this research by investigating the impacts of EZ incentives on economic 
growth outcomes measured directly in the EZ areas and in their most immediate vicinities.  Successful 
geographically targeted programs should boost economic growth in the assisted areas by either 
attracting new firms or helping existing firms to survive and grow in the zone areas.  Empirical 
evidence of such increased economic development would be found in increased employment, payroll, 
sales or capital expenditures.  Some states emphasize incentives that reward capital investments and 
others focus more on labor subsidies.  Measured outcomes will depend not only on factor input 
elasticities (Papke, 1993), but also on factor substitution induced by the particular incentives.  For 
example, “successful” zone capital incentives could potentially lead to greater zone investment and 
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output without any measured increase in employment if the incentives induce more capital-intensive 
production.  Therefore, it is particularly important to examine the different outcomes in the context of 
the different policy features.  The next section further describes these features and the data utilized to 
measure programmatic outcomes. 
 
3. Data 
This paper examines programs from ten states (California, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia) and the District of Columbia during the 
period 1982 to 1992.  These particular EZ programs were selected based on the following criteria: 
location of zones in urban distressed areas and/or in abandoned urban industrial parks; limited 
geographic extension of the program; and competition among local communities to receive the EZ 
status.  The 11 EZ programs target areas that, in general, qualify for zone consideration by virtue of 
economic distress as measured by per-capita income, unemployment, and poverty rates crossing certain 
thresholds.  In some states, zone eligibility is also based on population loss, land availability, and 
building vacancy criteria.  The bulk of the EZ incentive packages offered in the 11 sampled programs 
rely on relieving the tax burden on businesses by tying incentives to either the number of new jobs 
created or the amount of investment made in the zones.  In some cases, tax incentives are also 
complemented by in-kind services and utility subsidies.  A detailed description of each EZ program is 
available in HUD (1995).  
 The state-specific policy features of the 11 EZ programs are operationalized in terms of a small 
number of variables in order to facilitate empirical testing of the impacts of unique policy features.  
These policy variables, collected from official state and federal (HUD, 1997) documents and interviews 
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with zone officials, are described in Table 1.  As shown at the bottom of the table, the 11 zone 




The variable EZ_SIZE measures the fraction of each state’s total land area that comprised ZIP 
codes containing enterprise zones.  The top number reports this fraction for 1987 and the bottom 
number that for 1992.  In many of the states, the zone programs grew in size over the five year period, 
which is consistent with findings from geographically targeted programs in general (Greenbaum and 
Bondonio 2004) and enterprise zone programs in particular (Peters and Fisher, 2002; Talanker, 2003).  
The variable is used to test whether program size affects zone effectiveness, as there is some evidence 
that programs with fewer zones have been more successful (Erickson, 1992; Erickson and Friedman, 
1990b, 1991; Wilder and Rubin, 1996).  Because zones vary greatly in size, we prefer to measure 
relative land area designated rather than the count of the number of zones.  The next policy feature 
listed in Table 1, EC_PLAN, is a dichotomous variable that measures whether the submission of a 
strategic economic development plan is a prerequisite for zone selection.  Development of such a plan 
requires the coordinated effort of local economic development parties, and it has been argued that this 
sort of strategic planning can lead to better subsequent zone outcomes (Wilder and Rubin 1996).   
We employ two indicators to measure whether zone business incentives are tied to employment 
or capital investment requirements to test for possible incentive-induced substitution between capital 
and labor.  JOB_REQ is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether tax incentives are tied to 
creating new employment, and CAP_REQ similarly measures whether zone incentives are tied to new 
capital expenditures.  Six of the 11 programs have the jobs requirement, and five of the programs 
require evidence of capital expenditures. 
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Finally, the monetary value of the EZ incentives to businesses, EZ_VAL, is used to estimate 
and control for the marginal impact of the monetary value of each state’s EZ incentives on economic 
growth.  The measure is calculated using the hypothetical firm approach embedded in the TAIM 
software developed by Fisher and Peters (1998).  Following Bondonio and Engberg (2000), the 
monetary value of EZ incentives to businesses is defined as the difference between the average internal 
rate of return (IRR) computed through the TAIM software of an investment in a new plant made by a 
set of “typical” firms in an EZ area and the IRR of the same investment made by the same firms in a 
non-EZ area within the same state.  Calculating this within-state difference is useful because the 
monetary value local tax incentives is widely believed to affect firm’s location decisions primarily at 
the margin among similar nearby locations (e.g., Bartik, 1991; Bostic, 1996; Wilder and Rubin, 1996).  
While Peters and Fisher (2002) have expanded and extended the model (TAIMEZ), the TAIM algorithm 
available at the time of this analysis covered only five of the 11 states included in the data set, 
California, Kentucky, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.  The value of the incentives ranged from 
a 0.12 percent difference in the IRR in California to a more generous 0.74 percent difference in 
Virginia.  Because this measure could only be calculated for a subset of five states, the outcome 
analysis was replicated for both the “large” sample of 11 states and the smaller sub sample of five 
states. 
The location of zones is coded in terms of U.S. Postal ZIP codes.  Zone ZIP codes were either 
directly provided by local program officials or were retrieved by comparing maps provided by those 
officials to the ZIP code boundaries displayed by geographic information systems (GIS).  ZIP codes are 
a useful geographic size for measuring localized business activity because they can capture local 
demand factors such as population, income and wealth (Bingham and Zhang, 2001).  ZIP codes are 
also the smallest geographic unit for which detailed business data is available.  While zone boundaries 
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do not coincide with ZIP codes, they do not typically coincide with any other administrative 
boundaries, either.  Therefore, a ZIP area is coded as an EZ-ZIP if it includes any portion of an actual 
zone.  Although this decision rule is not ideal because zone boundaries that overlap small portions of 
neighboring and less distressed ZIP codes might lead to an underestimation of the zones level of 
distress (Greenbaum, 2004), methods to apportion the boundaries to ZIP codes also have drawbacks 
(Dowall, 1996).  Further, since EZ programs are aimed at improving local economies, it makes sense to 
be able to test whether zone designation has an impact on both the EZ areas and their most immediate 
vicinities.1  A further drawback to ZIP codes is that their boundaries change over time, and those 
changes are not well recorded.  Utilizing stable plant location identification codes from our business 
data, historic ZIP code area changes were identified to create a set of constant ZIP codes that could be 
used to compare data over time.  The last row in Table 1 shows that the number of ZIP codes that 
contain zones by the end of 1992 varies from two in the District of Columbia to 125 in California.  
Note that this is a measure of the number of ZIP codes rather than the number of actual zones.  For 
example, the District of Columbia designated three zones that were contained in two ZIP codes. 
Economic growth outcomes, in the form of employment, value of shipments, capital 
expenditures and payroll per employee are obtained from the quinquennial Census of Manufactures 
(CM) portion of the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Research Database (LRD).2  The data include every 
U.S. manufacturing plant with five or more employees in years 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992.3  One 
advantage of the CM data available from the LRD over the publicly available version is the ability to 
track establishment-specific characteristics over time because each establishment has a unique 
1 Below, we check whether our models are robust to alternative decision rules that only count a ZIP as an EZ ZIP if at least 
25 percent or 50 percent of its land contains an EZ. 
2  The LRD was accessed from the Census Bureau’s Carnegie Mellon Research Data Center in Pittsburgh, PA.  Results and 
descriptive statistics from the LRD have been screened to insure that no confidential data are revealed. 
3 At the time of the analysis, the 1997 CM_LRD data were not yet available to the public. 
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identification number.  Thus, pre-post intervention economic growth measures can be properly sorted 
into gross flows accounted for by new (establishments operating for the first time at their present 
location), existing (establishments operating at the same location as in the previous CM panel) and 
vanishing-establishments (establishments no longer in operation in the same location in the subsequent 
CM panel).  While we examine data only from the manufacturing sector of the economy, that is the 
sector most heavily targeted by EZ programs (Peters and Fisher, 2002). 
Finally, EZ pre-designation demographic, income, poverty, unemployment and population 
density characteristics are retrieved from the 1980 Decennial Census STF3a files.  The census tract 
level data were allocated to ZIP codes using the Mable Geocorr geographical correspondence engine 
that determines the degree of overlap between different spatial units (Blodgett and CIESIN, 1998).  As 
reported in Table 2, ZIP codes that subsequently became designated as EZs had in 1980, on average, 
higher unemployment rates, poverty rates, percentage of minority residents, and population density, 
and lower per capita income than ZIPs that were never designated.  These ZIP codes also had slower 
growth rates of employment and business establishments between the years 1977 and 1982, and they 




4. Method of Analysis 
4.1 Baseline model 
Impact estimates of the EZ incentives are retrieved through a “two-step conditioning on a propensity 
score” baseline model that has been recently used in other EZ evaluation studies (e.g., Bondonio and 
Engberg, 2000; Engberg and Greenbaum, 1999).  The model combines both a propensity score 
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approach to evaluation (e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984) and a panel-data fixed effects 
approach that eliminates the time unvarying unobserved ZIP-specific characteristics which may be 
potentially correlated with treatment assignment. 
  In the first step of the model, the probability that each ZIP code is designated as an EZ is 
estimated as a function of the pre-designation employment and establishment growth and the 1980 
socio-economic characteristics.  Ideally, designation probabilities would be estimated by a separate 
regression for each state to better take into account that each state has unique designation criteria.  
However, the aggregation of zone boundaries to the ZIP code level leaves several of the states with too 
few observations on the dependent variable to estimate separate regressions.  Instead, the probability of 
zone designation is estimated on two clusters of states. 
  The states are clustered based on the criteria mentioned in the state EZ legislations for selecting 
zone areas.  The first cluster of states share zone selection guidelines that primarily include income, 
unemployment or poverty indicators:  California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Kentucky, 
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.  In addition to the unemployment, income or poverty indicators, the 
second cluster of states share designation criteria that include measures of land availability or building 
vacancy:  Florida, Indiana, Maryland, New York, and Virginia.  For this second cluster of states, the 
probit specification also adds two 1980 housing market variables.  The probit regressions for the two 
clusters of states are illustrated in equations (1) and (2): 
P(EZi=1) = Ф(β1UNEMPi + β2POVi + β3INCi + β4DENSi +β5MINi + β6EMPGRWi + 
 β7ESTGRWi + φI ),         (1) 
 
P(EZi=1) = Ф (β1UNEMPi + β2POVi + β3INCi + β4DENSi +β5MINi + β6EMPGRWi + 
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 β7ESTGRWi +  β8OCCHOUSi +  β9VALHOUSEi + φII),    (2) 
where: 
i = ZIP codes; 
UNEMPi, POVi, INCi, DENSi, MINi = set of 1980 Census variables capturing unemployment, 
poverty, per capita income, population density and percentage of African Americans and 
Hispanics; 
EMPGRWi, ESTGRWi = 1977-1982 CM measures of employment and establishment growth; 
OCCHOUSi, VALHOUSEi = 1980 Census variables expressing the percentage of occupied houses 
and the average value of owner occupied houses; 
φI = set of states dummies for cluster I (CA, CT, DC, KY, NJ, PA for the large-sample analysis; 
CA, KY, PA for the small-sample analysis); 
φII = set of states dummies for cluster II: (FL, IN, MD, NY, VA for the large-sample analysis; NY, 
VA for the small-sample analysis). 
 
The predicted probabilities from equations (1) and (2) are referred to as propensity scores (Heckman et 
al., 1997, 1998; Rosembaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984) and can be interpreted as a single ZIP-specific 
parameters that summarize all of the pre-intervention economic growth and socio-economic measures 
in a single index.  
In the second step of the model, the predicted probabilities are inserted into the 5-year growth 
rate outcome regression of equation (3):  
Ln(Yit/ Yit-5) =   φj + γt + αEZit*Tit + Σpolϕpol(EZit*polit*Tit)+ ΣcδcPRci +   uit    (3) 
Where: 
 13
Decomposing the impacts:  Lessons from a multistate analysis of enterprise zone programs 
Bondonio and Greenbaum 
John Glenn Working Paper 2005-3 
 
                                                          
t = 1987, 1992;4 
i = ZIP;   
c = cluster of states I or II;  
 j = state; 
pol = EZ_SIZE, EC_PLAN, JOB_REQ, CAP_REQ, EZ_VAL5; 
Ln(Yit/ Yit) = outcome growth rate in the 5-year period ending in year t; 
EZit = 1 if ZIP i contains an EZ which was active in the 5-year period ending in year t; 
= 0 otherwise; 
Tit = [(t-tdi)/5] = portion of the 5-year period ending in year t in which ZIP i contained an active 
EZ where tdi = year of EZ designation in ZIP i; 
Σpolϕpol(EZit*Tit*polit) = set of interaction terms between EZ status, portion of the 5-year period 
in which ZIP i contained an active EZ and one of the policy variables. 
ΣcδcPRci  = (δIPRIi + δIIPRIIi ) = predicted probabilities from equations (1) and (2); 
φj  = set of state dummies; 
γt  = 5-year period dummy [=1 if the (t-(t-5)) period is 1982-87; =0 otherwise]; 
u = normally distributed error term. 
 
In equation (3), the program intervention is operationalized with a treatment status variable, weighted 
by the portion of the 5-year period in which the EZ was actually active, and a set of policy terms 
4  As the CM data are available only at 5-year intervals for the years 1977-1992, the period 1977-1982 cannot be used in the 
analysis because it is not possible to sort out outcomes by type of establishments for 1977 (which would only be possible by 
comparing the 1977 data with the unavailable 1972 data).  For this reason, the 5-year periods available for the analysis are 
only (1982-1987) and (1987-1992), and, therefore, t is either 1987 or 1992. 
5  These are the policy variables listed in Table 1. 
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[ϕEZ_SIZE(EZit*Tit*EZ_SIZEit),  ... , ϕEZ_VAL(EZit*Tit*EZ_VALit)] that interact the EZ status with each 
of the five state-specific policy variables.6  These interaction terms are included in the model 
specifically to test whether state-specific EZ policy features have an impact on the dependent variable.  
The propensity scores estimated from equations (1) and (2) are operationalized as two variables:  PRI 
and PRII.  The variable PRI is constructed as the predicted probability from equation (1) for all the ZIPs 
located within the states included in cluster I and equals zero for the ZIPs located in any of the other 
states.  Likewise, PRII contains the predicted probability from equation (2) for all the ZIPs included in 
cluster II and zero for all other ZIPs.   
The two propensity score variables control for all of the observed ZIP-specific pre-intervention 
growth trends and socio-economic characteristics.  As shown in Table 2, EZ areas tend to have more 
disadvantaged socio-economic conditions and slower growth trends prior to the beginning of the 
programs than non-EZ areas.  Such disadvantaged initial conditions could induce EZ areas to grow 
more slowly than non-EZ areas absent the program intervention.  Without properly controlling for such 
differences, impact estimates of the program intervention could be wrong due to this selection bias.  
The model of equation (3) sorts out impacts due to observable differences in pre-intervention growth 
trends and socio-economic characteristics (coefficients δ1, δ2) from the actual impacts due to the 
program intervention and the specific EZ policy features (coefficients α, ϕ).  Alternatively, each of the 
pre-designation characteristics could be directly inserted in equation (3) instead of being used in the 
two-step propensity score procedure.  The two-step procedure has the advantage that it constitutes a 
convenient way to deal with non-linearities in the relationship between the dependent variable growth 
rates and the pre-designation characteristics.  Failure to properly specify a model including all of the 
non-linearities in a one-step procedure would lead to a biased estimate of the treatment coefficient.  
6 The exact composition of the set of policy interaction term varies across specifications as illustrated in . Table 3
 15
Decomposing the impacts:  Lessons from a multistate analysis of enterprise zone programs 
Bondonio and Greenbaum 
John Glenn Working Paper 2005-3 
 
                                                          
Further, such a specification is difficult to model because economic theory does not offer solid 
guidance in this matter.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that conditioning on the propensity 
scores corresponds to conditioning on the correct functional form of the pre-designation variables in a 
direct regression of the outcome variable on the pre-designation variables.7 
Estimating the propensity score values also allows ZIP areas with very low or high designation 
probabilities to be excluded from the estimation sample.  In a matching-estimator setting, Heckman et 
al. (1997) and Dehejia and Wahba (1998) show that better impact estimates can be retrieved by limiting 
the estimation sample to observations with propensity scores for which there are both treatment and 
comparison observations.  In this paper, the estimation sample is restricted by excluding the ZIP codes 
with propensity scores within the 1st percentile of the EZ-ZIPs’ distribution or within the 99th 
percentile of the non-EZ ZIPs in order to reduce the influence of possible extreme outliers and alleviate 
the burden on the model to control for extreme pre-intervention characteristics.  
The model of equation (3) also controls for unobserved time-unvarying ZIP-specific 
characteristics that may be correlated with treatment assignment.  This can be seen by considering that 
equation (3) is obtainable by applying a panel data fixed-effect estimator (implemented through a long 
differencing transformation of the data)8 to the following outcome regression model: 
 
Yit= φj +γt +α∗t∗(EZit*Tit) + t∗[Σpolϕpol(EZit*polit*Tit)]+  t∗[ΣcδcPRci ]  + αj + ujt  (4)9 
 
7  Heckman et al. (1997) have argued that what claimed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) does necessarily apply when the 
propensity score has to be estimated instead of being known with certainty.  In such cases, according to Heckman et al., the 
conceptual and mechanical advantages of using a two-stage propensity score approach lies mostly in simplicity of 
estimation, mimicking the conventional econometric approach of using Mills ratios to correct for selection bias. 
8 Long differencing is used in place of the more standard differencing from the mean or first differencing procedures due to 
the CM-LRD data being available only at 5-year intervals. 
9 Coefficients of equation (4) are to be considered one fifth of those of equation (3) in order to allow exact correspondence 
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Compared to a standard panel data fixed effect estimation (in which time-unvarying pre-
intervention characteristics would have no role), the two-step model of equations (1-3) yields unbiased 
impact estimates of the treatment under weaker assumptions.  Standard fixed effect estimation is 
unbiased only assuming that all of the time-unvarying pre-intervention ZIP specific characteristics (that 
may be correlated with treatment assignment) have the same impact on the future levels of the 
dependent variable.  Our model, instead, allows unbiased impact estimates to be retrieved even if the 
observed ZIP-specific pre-intervention characteristics were correlated with treatment assignment and 
affect the dependent variable not just by impacting its future levels in the same way but also by 
impacting its future growth trend.  It should be noted, however, that our estimation procedure would 
yield biased impact estimates in the unlikely event that program officials designate EZ areas based 
solely on information unknown to the evaluator that would forecast which areas would otherwise 
growth the least or the most. 
If such unobservable ZIP-specific growth trends (that could be formalized, for example, by 
adding a simple linear term such as βit to equation 3) were correlated with treatment assignment (i.e., 
Cov (βit, EZit) ≠ 0), only random growth rates models (Boarnet and Bogart, 1996; Bondonio and 
Engberg, 2000; Heckman and Hotz, 1989; and Papke, 1993, 1994) would yield unbiased impact 
estimates of zone designation and EZ policy features.  Random growth rates models are not feasible 
here due to the limited number of observations across time.  However, the assumption of Cov (βit, EZit) 
≠ 0 should not be too worrisome for the EZ programs analyzed in this paper:  Even assuming that 
program officials would want to designate exclusively the best or worst future performers, their 
forecasting would likely have to be based on the same data and similar analytic tools available for this 
analysis.   
 
between equations (4) and (3). 
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Finally, other methods, such as instrumental variables (IV) and Mills Ratios (Heckman, 1976; 
Heckman and Robb, 1985; Lee, 1978), are also not applicable to this analysis because they require a 
subset of variables that affect EZ designation but do not affect the baseline growth of an area.10  For EZ 
programs, unfortunately, such variables are quite impossible to find because zone areas are designated 
based on the very same pre-intervention economic and social conditions that represent some of the 
major factors affecting the post-intervention economic growth of zones.   
 
4.2 Model specifications 
The coefficient estimates for the model of equation (3) are estimated for the four different economic 
growth measures considered in the analysis across three different gross flows and overall net changes 
and account for heterogeneity by using robust cluster estimators that adjust the coefficient standard 
errors for the possible within-state correlation of observations (Rogers, 1993; Williams, 2000; 
Wooldridge, 2002).  To compare the findings of this paper with those from other EZ studies, all sixteen 
specifications are first estimated without including any of the policy interaction terms other than the 
monetary value of the incentives, which is included only in the small-sample analysis.  The analysis is 
estimated differently for the large sample of 11 states and for the smaller sample of five states that have 
information on the monetary value of the incentives.  For the larger sample, all four policy interaction 
terms that are not formed with the monetary value of the incentives (ϕEZ_SIZE(EZit*Tit*EZ_SIZEit), 
ϕEC_PLAN(EZit*Tit*EC_PLANit), ϕJOB_REQ(EZit*Tit*JOB_REQit), ϕCAP_REQ(EZit*Tit*CAP_REQit)) are 
included in each specification. For the small-sample analysis, only two policy interaction terms are 
included at a time, one of which is always the monetary value of the EZ incentives.  This is a choice 
10 Mills Ratio methods need exclusion restrictions similar to those for IV models in order to obtain robust estimates 
(Robinson 1989). 
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made due to the limited variation in state-specific EZ policy features.  A complete description of all 
specifications is illustrated in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
5. Specification Tests and Sensitivity Analysis 
Equation  (3) is restrictive in two major ways.  First it imposes that zone designation has the same 
impact on the outcome growth of interest in each 5-year period after designation without distinguishing 
between zones designated 5 years prior to time t and zones designated more than 5 years prior to time t. 
Second, it forces zone designation to affect the outcome growth of interest in each of the two 5-years 
periods linearly as a proportion of the 5-year period for which zones have been in existence.  To test 
these restrictions, two less parsimonious and more generalized models are also analyzed.  The first of 
these models is illustrated in equation (5): 
 
Ln(Yit/Yit-5) = ∑n θnEZ_nit + ∑c δcPRci + φj + γt  +  uit,     (5) 
Where 
n =1,2,3,4; 
EZ_nit = 1 if [(n-1)*2.5] years < (t –tdi) ≤ [n*2.5] years; 
       = 0 otherwise; 
t = 1987, 1992; 
tdi = year of EZ designation. 
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In equation (5), the EZ status indicator (EZit) is replaced by a set of four EZ status variables, (EZ_1it, 
…EZ_4it), that reflect the age of the enterprise zone at time t measured at two and three-years intervals.  
EZ_1it equals 1 if ZIP i in year t is a zone in its first or second year of existence and zero otherwise.  
For example, when t =1987, EZ_1it=1 if ZIP i is a zone designated either in 1986 or 1985.  When t = 
1992, EZ_1it = 1 if ZIP i is a zone designated either in 1991 or 1990.  EZ_2it, indicates whether ZIP i in 
year t is a zone in its third, fourth or fifth year of existence.  Thus, when t = 1987, EZ_2it = 1 if ZIP i is 
a zone designated either in 1982, 1983 or 1984.  When t =1992, EZ_2it = 1 if ZIP i is a zone designated 
either in 1987, 1988 or 1989.  EZ_3it and EZ_4it, indicate whether a ZIP is a zone in its sixth-seventh 
and eighth-ninth-tenth year of existence, respectively.  The model of equation (5) is more generalized 
than that of equation (3) because it allows zone impacts to vary freely over time at two- and three- year 
intervals and because it is able to differentiate the impact of a zone designated at the beginning of the 
five-year period t-(t-5) from the impact of a zone designated in years prior to t-5. The model of 
equation (5) is implemented primarily to test the restrictions posed by the more parsimonious model of 
equation (3).  Fully developing the model of equation (5) to include all of the policy features would 
require adding to the equation sixteen interaction terms, obtained by multiplying each of the four EZ 
status variables with each one of the four policy variables.  The inclusion of these interaction terms 
would undermine the precision of any retrievable EZ policy feature impact estimate.11   
The specification of equation (5) can be used a way to test the two main restrictions posed by 
the equation (3).  Although the restricted model of equation (3) is not perfectly nested into the model of 
equation (5), an F-test where the null hypothesis is that θ3 = θ4 (i.e., the coefficient on EZ_3 is equal to 
11 The fully developed model of equation (5) would be: 
Ln(Yit/Yit-5) = ∑n θnEZ_nit + ∑n∑pol γn(pol)(EZ_nit*polit) + ∑c δcPRci + φj + γt  +  uit 
n =1,2,3,4 
EZ_nit= 1 if    (n-1)*2.5  <(t –tdi) ≤  n*2.5 years 
  0 otherwise 
Results from such specifications are available upon request to the authors. 
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that of EZ_4) can provide evidence on whether zones have the same impact on the dependent variable 
regardless of their previous age, provided that they are in place for the entire duration of the five-year 
period.  Likewise, an F-test, where the null hypothesis is that θ1 = (θ2 * 2/5) can provide evidence on 
whether zone designation affects the dependent variable linearly as a proportion of the five-year period 
for which zones have been in existence. 
 The second alternative model is illustrated in eq. (6): 
 
Ln(Yit/Yit-5) = ∑n ωn{EZit*[t-(tdi+n)]/5} + ∑c δcPRci + φj + γt  +  uit;   (6) 
where 
n = 0, 3, 6 
(t- tdi+n)  = 0  if (t- tdi+n) < 0 
   = (t- tdi+n)  if 0 ≤(t- tdi+n) < 5; 
   = 5  if (t- tdi+n) ≥ 5. 
 
In equation (6), the EZ status indicator EZit is replaced by a set of three EZ status variables (EZit*[t-
tdi]/5, EZit*[t-(tdi+3)]/5, and EZit*[t-(tdi+6)]/5), that reflect the portion of the five-year period ending in 
year t in which a zone has been in existence measured from different times.  EZit*[t-tdi]/5 expresses the 
portion of the five-year period ending in year t in which a zone i has been in existence, measured from 
the actual time tdi of zone designation.  EZit*[t-(tdi+3)]/5 expresses the portion of the five-year period 
ending in year t measured from three years after the time of designation tdi.  Finally, EZit*[t-(tdi+6)]/5 
expresses the portion of the five-year period ending in year t measured from six years after the time of 
designation tdi.  These three EZ status indicators allow the restrictions posed by the model of equation 
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(3) to be tested directly:  If the coefficients (ω3, ω6) on the two EZ status variables EZit*[t-(tdi+3)]/5 and 
EZit*[t-(tdi+6)]/5 are both zero, equation (6) collapses into equation (3).  Therefore, an F-test, where the 
null hypothesis is such that the coefficients ω3 and ω6 are both zero, tests directly if the restrictions 
posed equation (3) hold.12 
 Robustness of the results is finally also tested by replicating the model of equation (3) adopting 
two more stringent rules for sorting ZIP areas by EZ status:  ZIP areas are coded as EZ ZIPs if at least 
25, 50 or 75 percent of its land is covered by zones. 
 
6 Results 
Table 4 reports the results from the probit regression of equations (1) and (2).  The coefficient 
estimates highlight the more important pre-designation characteristics affecting the probability of EZ 
designation for the 11 state large-sample analysis.13  The importance of the pre-designation 
characteristics varies across the two clusters into which the states are grouped.  All states tend to 
designate areas with high proportions of minority residents and slow pre-designation employment 
growth.  However, states in cluster I also target areas with low per-capita income and high population 
density, while states in cluster II tend to designate areas with high poverty rates and low housing 
occupancy rates and values. 
 
Table 4 
12 Due to the limited variation in EZ policy features, the chosen specification allowing different growth rates after 3 and 6 
years from designation is preferable to a less parsimonious specification which includes five different growth rates (from 
time of designation and after 2, 4, 6 and 8 years) and 20 interaction terms to operationalize the state-specific policy features: 
Ln(Yit/Yit-5) = ∑n ωn{EZit*[t-(tdi+n)]/5} + ∑n∑pol γn(pol){EZit*[(t-(tdi+n))/5]*polit }+ ∑c δcPRci + φj + γt + uit; 
n = 0, 2, 4, 6, 8 
Nevertheless, the analysis has also been replicated with such specification and results are available upon request to the 
authors. 
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To test the validity of the clustering technique adopted, the analysis has been replicated 
adopting the specification of equation (2), which includes two housing variables, for estimating the 
propensity score estimates of the cluster I states.  Results from this specification, estimated on both the 
large and small samples of states, support the adopted clusters because the housing criteria do not affect 
zone designation for the cluster I states. 
 
6.1 Impact of EZ status and monetary value of incentives 
Results from the specifications without policy interaction terms are summarized in Table 5.  The 
coefficient estimates can be interpreted as the marginal percentage point contribution to the baseline 5-
year growth rate of zone designation and the generosity of the EZ packages.  Generosity is measured 
by comparing the difference in internal rate of return (∆IRR), as computed by the TAIM model, 
between a new investment in an EZ location and in a non-EZ location within the same state. 
 Mean impact estimates on the net economic growth outcomes (specifications I-IV) are reported 
on the top portion of Table 5.  Results from the specifications are in line with much of the recent 
econometric empirical evidence on EZ programs showing a modest and statistically insignificant net 
impact of zone designation  
Impact estimates of EZ status on employment, value of shipments and capital expenditure gross 
flows accounted for by new establishments show a positive marginal contribution of EZ designation to 
the 5-year baseline growth rates.  These impact estimates range from 19.1 (specification VII, growth in 
capital expenditures) to 25.2 (specification V, employment growth) percentage points for the analysis 
on the large sample of states and from 10.3 to 29.3 percentage points for the small sample analysis.  
 
13 Results for the five state small-sample analysis are very similar.  They are therefore omitted for the sake of brevity and 
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Zone designation, by contrast, marginally depresses the baseline growth rate of the payroll per 
employee accounted for by the new establishments.  The size of this negative impact is 32.4 and 35.6 
percentage points for the large- and small-sample analysis, respectively.  Impact estimates of zone 
designation on the baseline growth rates of employment, value of shipments and capital expenditures 
accounted for by existing establishments are also found to be positive (specifications IX-XII of Table 
5), although the size of these estimates is much smaller than that on new establishment outcomes, 
ranging from 5.7 (specification X, growth in value of shipments) to 7.6 (specification XI, growth in 
capital expenditures) percentage points for the large-sample analysis and from 3.2 to 6.1 percentage 
points for the small sample analysis.  No significant impact of EZ designation is estimated on the 
growth rate of payroll per employee accounted for by the existing-establishments.  The final four 
specifications reported report the impact of zone designation on the 5-year rate-losses accounted for by 
vanishing establishments.  In this part of the analysis, zone designation is found to significantly 
increase the baseline rate-loss of employment, value of shipments and capital expenditures in both the 
large and small sample analyses.  EZ impact estimates for the payroll per employee specification, 
instead, do not reach statistical significance at conventional levels.  For all specifications reported in 
Table 5, the estimated impacts of the monetary value of the EZ incentives in the small sample analyses 




In general, these results prove to be quite robust, as they withstand the challenge of replicating 
the analysis with the alternative models of equations (5) and (6).  Results from the model of equation 
 
are available from the authors. 
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(5) are entirely consistent with the findings illustrated in Table 5.  The two specification tests, H0: θ3 = 
θ4 and H0: θ1 = θ2*2/5, developed from equation (5) to check whether the restrictions posed by the 
model of equation (3) hold are in favor of accepting the restrictions.  Results from the model of 
equation (6) show that estimating three different changes in the baseline growth rate measured at 
different times from zone designation do not provide any additional reliable information on the 
marginal impact of zone designation due to the loss in precision in retrieving the three slope estimates.  
The overall significance test on the three slope coefficients of equation (6) and their signs corroborate 
the findings retrieved from the model of equation (3).  The specification test Ho: ω3 = ω6 = 0 from 
equation (6), which checks the functional restrictions posed by equation (3), also favors accepting such 
restrictions.14 
 
6.2 Marginal Contribution of EZ Policy Features 
Table 6 summarizes the results for the four specifications (V-VIII) of equation (3) estimated on the 
large sample of states that have new establishment gross flow dependent variables and that fully 
include the EZ policy features interaction terms.15  Similar to the results in Table 5, zone designation is 
found to positively affect employment, value of shipments and capital expenditure gross flows 
accounted for by new-establishments   Although zone designation appears to have a positive impact on 
new establishments, expansion of the program to more areas appears to counteract that effect since 
increases in the portion of the state designated as EZs significantly reduces growth rates across all four 
specifications.  For each one-standard deviation increase in the land coverage of zones, there is a 
14 Results for coefficient estimates and specification tests from all specifications of equations (5) and (6) are omitted for the 
sake of brevity and are available from the authors. 
15 Results from the small-sample analysis are omitted for the sake of brevity.  They are in all very similar to those from the 
large sample of states and  are available upon request to the authors. 
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statistically significant marginal decrease in the 5-year baseline growth rates of -20.5, -17.5 and -14.6 
percentage points for employment, value of shipments and capital expenditures, respectively.   
Designating a larger portion (i.e. one standard deviation increase) of land covered by zones is also 




Table 7 illustrates the impact estimates of the EZ status and the state-specific EZ policy features 
on existing-establishment gross flows for the large sample of states (specifications IX-XII).16  
Estimates for the employment specification (IX) highlight that providing EZ incentives tied to the 
number of new jobs created is the only policy variable that marginally affects the employment baseline 
growth rate, with a positive marginal impact estimate of 22.2 percentage points on a 5-year growth rate.  
Tying incentives to hiring requirements is also found to be the only significant policy variable in the 
payroll per employee specification (XII), showing, however, a negative marginal impact of -31.2 
percentage points.  Mandating the provision of a strategic economic plan is the only policy feature 
significantly affecting the baseline growth rate of both value of shipments (specification X) and capital 





16 Again, results from the small sample analysis are omitted for the sake of brevity.  Results from the small sample of states 
are very similar to those illustrated in  and are available from the authors. Table 6
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Results for the vanishing-establishment specifications (XIII-XVI), not reported for the sake of 
brevity,17 highlight that, consistent with the results of Table 6, EZ status is found to marginally 
accelerate the rate-loss of employment, value of shipments and capital expenditures.  None of the EZ 
policy interaction terms added to the model is found to significantly affect the baseline rate loss in any 
of the four estimated specifications. 
 All results reported in this section are robust in three ways.  First, they are corroborated by the 
results from the specifications estimated on the small sample of states that allows the TAIM estimates 
of the monetary value of the EZ incentives to be included in the analysis.  Second, they endure 
replicating the analysis by coding ZIP areas as EZ ZIPs only if they have at least either 25 percent, 50 
percent or 75 percent of their land covered by actual zones.  Third, the restrictions posed by the chosen 
functional form of equation 3 are accepted by the specification tests performed by replicating the 
analysis with the models of equations (4) and (5). 
 
7. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
This paper examines states’ EZ experience of the mid 1980s to 1990s to test whether or not different 
impacts of EZ programs may be detected by looking at employment, sales (measured as value of 
shipments), capital expenditures and payroll per employee growth outcomes.  These outcomes are 
evaluated separately for new-establishments, existing-establishments and vanishing-establishments.  
Testing whether EZ incentives differentially affect the various gross flows of local economic growth is 
important as some programs may focus on the attraction of new establishments while others may target 
the expansion or the retention of existing establishments.  Knowing whether or not certain specific 
policy features are found to favor the attraction of new businesses instead of the retention of existing 
17 Results for such specifications are available upon request from the authors. 
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production activities (or vice versa) may be an important piece of information to refine future 
geographically-targeted tax incentive initiatives. 
Results show that when local employment, sales, capital expenditures and payroll per employee 
growth outcomes are sorted into different gross flows, EZ incentives do have some significant impacts.  
In particular, EZ policies are found to positively affect the gross flows of employment, sales, and 
capital expenditures accounted for by new-establishments.  This positive impact, however, is 
counteracted by the overall territorial extension of the designated zones:  Zones in states with a small 
geographic extension of zones tend to attract more employment and economic activity from new 
establishments than zones in states with a large EZ territorial extension.  Changes in payroll per 
employee accounted for by new-establishments are negatively affected by the introduction of EZ 
incentives.  Employment, sales and capital expenditures accounted for by existing establishments tend 
also to be positively affected by EZ policies, although by a smaller extent.  For existing-establishment 
outcomes, however, tying zone incentives to job creation requirements is found to promote 
employment growth, while requiring the submission of an economic development strategic plan as part 
of the EZ application process promotes growth in sales and capital expenditures.  EZ policies, finally, 
are found to significantly accelerate the rate-loss of employment, sales, and capital expenditures 
accounted for by vanishing establishments.   
Similar to the empirical evidence of other recent econometric studies (e.g., Boarnet and Bogart, 
1996; Bondonio and Engberg, 2000; Dowall, 1996; Greenbaum and Engberg, 2004; Peters and Fisher, 
2002), mean impact estimates of the EZ incentives are found to not significantly affect any measure of 
net local economic growth.  There are different possible explanations for these findings.  New 
businesses could simply increase the rate at which previously existing businesses leave the area 
(Greenbaum & Engberg, 2004).  In addition, new jobs and new economic activity are potentially much 
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more politically visible than retention of existing jobs and economic activity.  New economic activity is  
used to emphasize the merit of EZ programs, while business closures are often unlikely to be linked to 
zone designation.  As a result, zone incentives may tend to be marketed more toward attracting new 
establishments than toward helping struggling existing ones. 
 The greatest relevance of these findings, however, is perhaps related to the opportunity offered 
by the analysis to empirically test a number of predictions on recommended incentive features for 
geographically targeted economic development initiatives that stem from economic theory and/or 
interviews with business representatives and EZ program officials.  Such predictions can be 
summarized as follows. 
Incentives that reduce the price of capital goods may increase production and employment by 
lowering costs, but they may also have a substitution effect by inducing businesses to substitute capital 
for labor (Papke 1993).  Programs that tie tax incentives awarded to zone businesses to the number of 
new jobs created, for example, can be viewed as more effective in promoting local employment growth 
than programs that tie incentives to capital investments (Wilder and Rubin 1996).  Moreover, tax 
incentives are expected to appeal more to established businesses than to start-ups, since new businesses 
do not typically expect to make profits in the first years of operation (Sheldon and Elling 1989).  Thus, 
programs that tie tax incentives to the creation of new jobs can benefit zone employment when the 
target of zone designation are primarily existing establishments.  The results of the analysis presented 
in the paper support this prediction showing that tying incentives to new jobs created is the only EZ 
feature that marginally increases the baseline employment growth of existing EZ firms.  Tying 
incentives to new jobs is, however, not found to have a significant impact on employment for either 
new firms or for outcomes other than employment.  As EZ incentives are also not found to boost 
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payroll per employee, the results of the analysis suggest that the new jobs created tend not to be more 
skilled than existing jobs.  
The provision of a strategic local economic development plan among the program application 
requirements may be important for effectively promoting zone employment and economic growth.  For 
example, California program officials interviewed by Bostic (1996) revealed that the strategic planning 
portion of the application process was important to organize local development resources in a more 
productive way.  In particular, mandating the submission of a strategic plan is viewed to be a key 
feature of EZ policies to effectively support existing firms.  The development of an EZ strategic plan 
often brings together local business leaders with various administrative and community officials, thus 
facilitating communication regarding business needs and at the same time making business owners 
more aware of the opportunities offered by the EZ incentive packages.   
Robust empirical support is offered to this prediction by the results of the analysis that show 
that the requirement of a strategic plan as part of the zone application process is beneficial to induce 
growth in sales and capital investment of existing establishments.  The strategic plan requirement, 
however, does not significantly affect the attraction of new economic activity brought by new 
businesses.  This may suggest that other efforts are necessary to inform potential investors about the 
availability of zone incentives. 
According to program officials, the territorial extension of designated zones is the most relevant 
factor in boosting zone employment and economic activity brought by the attraction of new firms 
(Bostic 1996).  In particular, EZ programs are viewed to be more successful in attracting new business 
if they adopt a competitive zone selection process that yields few designated EZs of limited size.  EZ 
programs with limited zone territorial extension are advocated for three reasons.  First, they allow more 
intense marketing efforts to each single zone (Wilder and Rubin 1996).  Second, they enable program 
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officials to better evaluate the potential comparative advantage of the different eligible areas, yielding 
to the designation of areas that have developed the strongest local support for economic growth.  Third, 
they facilitate close program monitoring and evaluation.  
The results of the analysis support this prediction by showing that the baseline employment and 
economic growths accounted for by new establishments are positively affected by the reduction of the 
overall zone territorial extension.  Reducing the territorial extension of the program is also found to 
increase the attraction of firms that offer higher levels of payroll per employee, suggesting that efforts 
to attract new businesses with qualified job opportunities are more successful if the size of the program 
is limited.  
As state legislators continue to re-examine their enterprise zone programs, this paper offers 
some guidance based upon the experience of earlier programs.  Within zone areas, greater attention 
should be paid to existing businesses, as the incentive programs studied in this paper benefited new 
establishments at the expense of established businesses.  In particular, we find two policy features that 
have greater positive impacts on existing businesses than on new establishments.  Job creation 
requirements appear to have some positive impacts in encouraging increased employment in existing 
businesses, and the requirement of a strategic local economic development plan appears to have 
induced increased sales and capital investment in existing establishments.   
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Table 1. Policy Features of Enterprise Zone Programs 
 
Policy feature Description Measure CAa CT DC FL IN KY MD NJ NY PA VA 
Size of EZ 
program 
(EZ_SIZE)  
Size of the program in terms of 
percentage of the total state land 
occupied by EZs in 1987 and 
1992 b 






0.8   
2.75
0    
14.55



















EZ designation follows a 
competitive application process 
requiring the submission of a 
strategic economic development 
plan by prospective EZ 
communities 
1=yes         
0=no 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Tax incentives 
proportional 
to new jobs 
(JOB_REQ) 
Program tax incentives based on 
the number of new jobs created 
by EZ firms 
1=yes         







Program tax incentives based on 
the size of the new capital 
expenditures promoted by EZ 
firms 
1=yes         








% point difference in the internal 
rate of return (IRR) between 
typical firms investing in a new 
plant in EZ and non-EZ 




0.12 - - - - 0.22 - - 0.18 0.23 0.74
 Program starting date Year 1986 1982 1987 1987 1984 1983 1983 1985 1987 1983 1984
 EZ ZIPsd Count 125 17 2 91 37 46 16 20 41 121 60 
 
Notes:        
a California initially established two EZ programs that, respectively, established the Enterprise Zones and the 
Employment and Economic Incentive Areas.  Because the two programs did not differ from each other in the policy 
dimensions considered in this paper, they are treated as a single program.   
b The top number measures the percentage in 1987 and the bottom number measures the percentage in 1992. 
c ∆IRR values vary across two-digit SIC industrial sectors. The values reported are state-specific average figures obtained 
by weighting each two-digit SIC specific estimate by the proportion of establishments operating in the state in that industrial 
sector prior to the start of the EZ program.  Data are missing for CT, DC, FL, IN, MD and NJ because the available version 
of the TAIM software did not include those states at the time of analysis. 
d Number of ZIP code areas encompassing any portion of EZ areas in existence at December 31,1992. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Pre-Designation ZIP Code Characteristics: 
11 State Sample 
 
 




Variable Zone ZIPs  Non-zone ZIPs 
    
Unemplyment rate, 1980 UNEMP 0.048 0.042 
  (0.018) (0.027) 
Poverty rate, 1980 POV 0.179 0.106 
  (0.103) (0.068) 
Per capita income (in $1,000s), 1980 INC 5.968 7.253 
  (1.554) (2.149) 
Population density (1,000 people per km2), 1980 DENS 1.856 1.015 
  (2.651) 2.957 
Percentage of population black or Hispanic, 1980 MIN 0.307 0.111 
  (0.294) (0.174) 
Employment growth rate, 1977-1982  EMPGRW -0.008 0.235 
 (0.732) (0.997) 
Establishment growth rate, 1977-1982  ESTGRW 0.561 0.799 
 (0.777) (1.189) 
Percentage of occupied housing units   OCCHOUS 0.877 0.893 
(occupied units/total units), 1980  (0.057) (0.107) 
Average value of owner occupied houses (in $1,000s), 1980 VALHOUS 48.710 60.611 
 (24.367) (32.064) 
 
Notes: 
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Table 3 Model Specifications 
                           EZ Treatment Variables Included 
  Dependent variable:  ln(Yt/Yt-5)  Specification  11 State Sample  5 State Sample 
     
A. Equations with no EZ policy interaction terms    
Net growth outcomes      
 Employment  EMP I    
 Value of shipments SHIP II    
 Capital expenditures CAP III    
 Payroll per employee PAYR IV    
Outcomes due to new establishments     
 Employment  EMP_NEW V     
 Value of Shipments SHIP_NEW VI     
 Capital expenditures CAP_NEW VII    
 Payroll per employee PAYR_NEW VIII    
Outcomes due to existing establishments  EZ*T EZ*T  
 Employment  EMP_EXT IX   and 
 Value of Shipments SHIP_EXT X    EZ*T*EZ_VAL 
 Capital expenditures CAP_EXT XI    
 Payroll per employee PAYR_EXT XII    
Outcomes due to vanishing establishments    
 Employment  EMP_VAN XIII    
 Value of Shipments SHIP_VAN XIV    
 Capital expenditures CAP_VAN XV    
 Payroll per employee PAYR_VAN XVI    
       
B. Equations with EZ policy interaction terms     
Net growth outcomes       
 Employment  EMP I  (EZ*T) 
 Value of shipments SHIP II  (EZ*T) and 
 Capital expenditures CAP III   (EZ*T*EZ_VAL) 
 Payroll per employee PAYR IV     
Outcomes due to new establishments      
 Employment  EMP_NEW V    Specifications replicated 
 Value of Shipments SHIP_NEW VI    separately including one of 
 Capital expenditures CAP_NEW VII  (EZ*T)  the following groups of terms
 Payroll per employee PAYR_NEW VIII  and a) (EZ*T), (EZ*T*EZ_VAL),
Outcomes due to existing establishments  (EZ*T*EZ_SIZE) (EZ*T*EZ_SIZE) 
 Employment  EMP_EXT IX  and  
 Value of Shipments SHIP_EXT X  (EZ*T*EC_PLAN) b) (EZ*T), (EZ*T*EZ_VAL),
 Capital expenditures CAP_EXT XI  and (EZ*T*EC_PLAN) 
 Payroll per employee PAYR_EXT XII  (EZ*T*JOB_REQ)  
Outcomes due to vanishing establishments  and c) (EZ*T), (EZ*T*EZ_VAL),
 Employment  EMP_VAN XIII  (EZ*T*CAP_REQ) (EZ*T*JOB_REQ) 
 Value of Shipments SHIP_VAN XIV    
 Capital expenditures CAP_VAN XV   d) (EZ*T), (EZ*T*EZ_VAL),
  Payroll per employee PAYR_VAN XVI      (EZ*T*CAP_REQ) 
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Table 4. Probability of Zone Designation: 
Probit Estimates from Equations (1) and (2) for 11 State Sample 
 
                                   Variablesa   









     
Unemployment rate, 1980 UNEMP -1.888  -0.286 
  (2.177)  (1.202) 
Poverty rate, 1980 POV 1.104  2.129***
  (0.721)  (0.814) 
Per capita income (in $1,000s), 1980 INC -0.084***  0.042 
  (0.031)  (0.044) 
Population density (1,000 people per km2), 1980 DENS 0.091***  -0.013 
  (0.019)  (0.014) 
Proportion of population black or Hispanic, 1980 MIN 1.579***  1.387***
  (0.225)  (0.229) 
Employment growth rate, 1977-1982 EMPGRW -0.127**  -0.128** 
  (0.063)  (0.058) 
Establishment growth rate, 1977-1982 ESTGRW 0.017  0.049 
  (0.110)  (0.101) 
     
Percentage of occupied housing units   OCCHOUS -  -1.437***
(occupied units/total units), 1980    (0.387) 
Average value of owner occupied houses (in $1,000s), 1980 VALHOUSE -  -0.008** 
    (0.003) 
          
Number of observations  3068  2828 
Pseudo R2  0.2785  0.2736 
Log likelihood   -830.42   -671.04 
 
Notes: 
* p-value<0.1      ** p-value<0.05        *** p-value<0.01   
 
Standard errors are in parentheses.     
a For clarity of exposition, the coefficient estimates on the state fixed effects are not reported and are 
available upon request. 
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Table 5. Impact Estimates of Zone Designation on Five-Year Growth Rates: 
Estimates from Equation (3) without the Policy Interaction Terms 
 
  11-state samplec  5-state sampled 
Dependent variable (5-year growth rates) a,b 
 
Model 
Impact of EZ 
designation 
 Impact of EZ 
designation 
Mon. Val of  
EZ incentive 
Net growth outcomes      
0.019 0.031 0.047 Employment EMP (I) (0.033)  (0.067) (0.057) 
0.012 0.014 0.053 Value of shipments SHIP (II) (0.042)  (0.019) (0.067) 
0.035 0.024 0.036 Capital expenditures CAP (III) (0.052)  (0.019) (0.031) 
-0.034 -0.074 0.222 Payroll per employee PAYR (IV) (0.037)  (0.077) (0.219) 
      
Outcomes due to new establishments      
0.252*** 0.293* 0.260 Employment EMP_NEW (V) (0.080)  (0.167) (0.491) 
0.199** 0.191* 0.101 Value of shipments SHIP_NEW (VI) (0.101)  (0.102) (0.216) 
0.191* 0.103** 0.233 Capital expenditures CAP_NEW (VII) (0.099)  (0.036) (0.205) 
-0.324*** -0.356*** -0.006 Payroll per employee PAYR_NEW (VII) (0.067)  (0.138) (0.408) 
      
Outcomes due to existing establishments      
0.067*** 0.032*** 0.146 Employment EMP_EXT (IX) (0.028)  (0.010) (0.103) 
0.057*** 0.061** 0.102 Value of Shipments SHIP_EXT (X) (0.028)  (0.029) (0.101) 
0.076** 0.041*** 0.156 Capital expenditures CAP_EXT (XI) (0.046)  (0.016) (0.106) 
-0.031 -0.099 0.290 Payroll per employee PAYR_EXT (XII) (0.040)  (0.083) (0.236) 
      
Outcomes due to vanishing establishments      
0.192** 0.205** -0.134 Employment EMP_VAN (XIII) (0.087)  (0.101) (0.106) 
0.148* 0.174* -0.110 Value of shipments SHIP_VAN (XIV) (0.108)  (0.103) (0.091) 
0.160* 0.183* -0.098 Capital expenditures CAP_VAN (XV) (0.103)  (0.104) (0.082) 
-0.102 -0.093 0.115 Payroll per employee PAYR_VAN (XVI) (0.070)  (0.145) (0.248) 
 
Notes: 
* p-value<0.1 ** p-value<0.05 *** p-value < 0.01 
a   For clarity of exposition, the coefficient estimates on the state dummies, the propensity scores, 
     and the (1982-1987) five-year period dummy are not reported and are available upon request. 
b  Prob>F = 0.000 (H0: All coefficients=0) for all specifications. 
c  N=11,766 for specifications (I-IV); N=8,284 (V-VIII); N=11,046 (IX-XII); N=7,622 (XIII-XVI). 
d  N=7,852 for specifications (I-IV); N=5,368 (V-VIII); N=7,352 (IX-XII); N=5,086 (XIII-XVI). 
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Table 6. Marginal Impact of EZ Policy Features on New Establishment Outcomes: 
Results from Specifications (V-VII), Equation (3) 
 
   Specification/Dependent Variableb 
                         Independent Variablesa   (V)         EMP_NEW
(VI)        
SHIP_NEW
(VII)        
CAP_NEW 
(VIII)       
PAYR_NEW
       
ZONE DESIGNATION      
 Portion of 5 years with active EZ EZ*T 0.692** 0.756* 0.687* 0.299 
   (0.322) (0.406) (0.397) (0.271) 
ZONE POLICIES      
 Strategic economic plan EC_PLAN 0.134 0.025 -0.087 -0.478 
   (0.192) (0.242) (0.236) (0.361) 
 Incentives tied to job creation JOB_REQ -0.308 -0.352 -0.426 -0.042 
   (0.192)  (0.241) (0.236) (0.161) 
 Incentives tied to capital expenditures CAP_REQ 0.025 -0.164 0.053 -0.198 
   (0.177)  (0.222)  (0.217) (0.148)  
 Portion of state land covered by zones EZ_SIZE -0.730** -0.641** -0.535 -0.493** 
     [1=10% increase]  (0.315)  (0.296)  (0.387)  (0.234)  
              
Adjusted R2  0.3306 0.3051 0.3037 0.2042 
 
Notes: 
* p-value<0.1      ** p-value<0.05        *** p-value<0.01   
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
N = 8,282 
Prob>F = 0.000 (H0: All coefficients = 0) for all specifications. 
a  For clarity of exposition, the coefficient estimates on the state fixed effects, propensity score variables and time fixed 
effects are not reported.  These are available from the authors. 
b  F-tests of joint significance has been performed for all of the variables with the coefficient estimates having p-values > 
0.10.  For all four of the specifications, F-test results lead to failure to reject the null hypothesis of non-significance. 
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Table 7. Marginal Impact of EZ Policy Features on Existing Establishment Outcomes: 
Results from Specifications (IX-XII), Equation (3) 
 
   Specification/Dependent Variableb 
                         Independent Variablesa   (IX)        EMP_EXT 
(X)         
SHIP_EXT 
(XI)        
CAP_EXT 
(XII)        
PAYR_EXT
       
ZONE DESIGNATION      
 Portion of 5 years with active EZ EZ*T 0.071 -0.083 0.235 -0.076 
   (0.156)  (0.195)  (0.270)  (0.165)  
ZONE POLICIES      
 Strategic economic plan EC_PLAN -0.060 0.258** 0.175* 0.165 
   (0.092)  (0.116)  (0.060)  (0.097)  
 Incentives tied to job creation JOB_REQ 0.222** 0.017 -0.110 -0.312*** 
   (0.092)  (0.115)  (0.159)  (0.097)  
 Incentives tied to capital expenditures CAP_REQ -0.043 0.054 0.105 0.058 
   (0.085)  (0.107)  (0.148)  (0.090)  
 Portion of state land covered by zones EZ_SIZE 0.057 0.145 -0.111 0.121 
     [1=10% increase]  (0.150)  (0.188 (0.261) (0.159)  
              
Adjusted R2   0.3229 0.3293 0.3206 0.2104 
 
Notes: 
* p-value<0.1      ** p-value<0.05        *** p-value<0.01   
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
N = 11,046 
Prob>F = 0.000 (H0: All coefficients = 0) for all specifications. 
a  For clarity of exposition, the coefficient estimates on the state fixed effects, propensity score variables and time fixed 
effects are not reported.  These are available from the authors. 
b  F-tests of joint significance has been performed for all of the variables with the coefficient estimates having p-values > 
0.10.  For all four of the specifications, F-test results lead to failure to reject the null hypothesis of non-significance. 
 
